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To Manage, Resolve or Transform? The 
Way Forward for the EU in the Middle 
East Peace Process 
ANDERS PERSSON
*
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT This article argues that 40 years of EU peacebuilding in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict have produced few significant results with a possible exception to this 
being the parameters provided by the EU for a just peace in the conflict. In any case, it is 
difficult to characterise these past four decades of EU involvement as anything other than a 
failure. Consequently, the main argument of this article is that a new strategy for the EU’s 
peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is urgently needed. As both the approaches of 
conflict management and conflict resolution have been tried and have failed, this article 
argues that the EU has far better potential in transforming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
than in managing or resolving it. An EU strategy more clearly based on the principles of 
conflict transformation is therefore the best way forward for the EU in the Middle East peace 
process. 
Introduction 
The European Union has sought to establish a just peace between the Israelis and Palestinians 
since the early 1970s, when the integration level of what was then called the European 
Community reached a point where it could begin to act in international politics.
1
 During these 
past four decades, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the most important 
issues for the EU in its foreign policy, even defined as a „strategic priority‟ for the EU in its 
security strategy from 2003.
2
 However, the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has lasted 
in different forms for more than a hundred years now indicates that neither the belligerents 
themselves nor outside powers like the EU have been very successful in their peacebuilding 
efforts.
3
 Even if politicians, academics and others often talk about the role the EU could or 
should play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear that the EU at present finds itself in a 
difficult situation, unable together with the US and the rest of the world community to achieve 
a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the rhetorical level the members of the 
European Union have come to accept and publicly endorse a two-state solution with an 
independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel. Still 
                                                          
* Anders Persson is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden 
(anders.persson@svet.lu.se). This article has been written as part of a larger research project on “Just and 
Durable Peace by Piece” #217488, which is funded by the EU‟s 7th Framework Programme. 
1
 Soren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, The European Union and the Middle East (London: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2002), p. 84. 
2
 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms 
Upload/78367.pdf, (accessed 15 October  2010), p. 8. 
3
 In this article, peacebuilding is used as an umbrella term for a wide range of approaches that address conflict, 
violence and peace. 
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however, there is much disagreement on how to realise a future Palestinian state and, more 
generally, over how to approach the conflict on a practical level. This is particularly true 
among the ‟Big Three‟ (France, Germany and the UK) which all seem to have their own 
strategies and priorities in the region.
4
 This issue has especially come to the fore in times of 
crisis; the EU had severe problems formulating a coherent policy with regards to the 2006 
Second Lebanon War and the 2008-2009 Gaza War, for example. The past four decades of 
EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have arguably produced few significant 
results, with a possible exception to this being the parameters provided by the EU for a just 
peace in the conflict, particularly by promoting Arab and later Palestinian claims as legitimate 
demands. At the same time, it is fair to say that few other international third parties can point 
to any successes when it comes to building peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Yet, as 
the Union‟s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has entered its fifth decade, the EU, 
together with other international actors, seem to be in desperate need of more effective 
peacebuilding strategies in this conflict. In addressing this problem, the main argument of this 
article is that the EU should base its peacebuilding strategy on the principles of conflict 
transformation rather than on conflict management or conflict resolution as it has previously 
done. With Israeli settlements constantly expanding and with deep internal divisions in the 
leadership on both sides over how (and even if) to divide the land, it is increasingly clear that 
the prospects for resolving the conflict in the near future are slim. As the conflict resolution 
approach appears to have reached a dead end, and as the EU has not been able to effectively 
manage the conflict via the conflict management approach, the EU should invest its resources 
and peacebuilding efforts in conflict transformation. As will be outlined in this article, an EU 
peacebuilding strategy more clearly based on conflict transformation would have greater 
chances of being successful and would benefit both the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
Third Party Approaches to Mitigate Conflicts  
Under the umbrella of third party peacebuilding, several terms are used in the literature to 
describe international efforts to mitigate conflicts and other similar activities within the field 
of peace and conflict studies. Despite the existence of a plethora of different approaches and 
interrelated terms, such as William Zartman‟s concepts of „conflict ripeness‟ and ‟mutually 
hurting stalemate‟,5 most researchers would probably agree that there are three main 
approaches for the more specific study of conflicts under the peacebuilding umbrella: conflict 
management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.
6
 Considerable confusion exists 
within the field over how to describe these approaches, and not least over how they differ 
from each other. Cordula Reimann has described this as a „jungle of conceptual and 
                                                          
4
 Patrick Muller, Europe’s Political Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process – A Comparison of the 
Foreign Policies of the ”Big-Three” EU Member States vis-à-vis the Peace Process (Conference paper, BISA 
2006), p. 16. 
5
 William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). 
6
 Hugh Miall „Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task‟ in The Berghof Handbook for Conflict 
Transformation, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/std_page.php?LANG =e&id=11, (accessed 15 October  
2010); Cordula Reimann, „Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation' in The Berghof Handbook 
for Conflict Transformation, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/std_page.php?LANG=e&id=11, (accessed 15 
October  2010); Karin Aggestam, Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998 
(Lund: Lund University Press, 1999); Thania Paffenholz, „Understanding Peacebuilding Theory: Management, 
Resolution and Transformation‟, New Routes, 14:2 (2009), p. 3. 
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definitional imprecision‟.7 Reimann has together with Kevin Clements and others noticed how 
loosely defined and often interchangeably used the terms conflict management, conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation are in the literature.
8
 The three approaches are 
sometimes used to refer to the same strategies, according to Reimann and Clements. What 
they all have in common, though, is an intention of creating political will for change among 
the belligerents. The mitigation of conflicts does not necessarily have to include the 
intervention of a third party, but the reality of many contemporary protracted conflicts with 
their substantial international linkages makes it very hard for the conflicting parties 
themselves to get out from the destructive relationships which they find themselves in without 
external help, as Laurent Goetschel and others have pointed out.
9
 Whether or not a third party 
intervention will be successful is of course also highly dependent on the third party itself, its 
character, recourses and commitment. 
Conflict Management 
The oldest of the three approaches, conflict management, is anchored in political realism and 
aims at managing rather than resolving conflicts.
10
 Advocates of this approach view conflicts 
as natural phenomena and further argue that resolving conflicts is unrealistic. Consequently, 
the best that can be done in violent conflicts is to try to manage and contain them.
11
 The 
approach of conflict management tries to identify leaders in power who can be brought to the 
negotiating table to broker an agreement. It is top-down structured and believes that only 
those in power have the abilities to bring an end to large-scale violence.
12
 Conflict 
management focuses exclusively on powerful third parties with the resources to bring 
pressure on the conflicting parties and induce them to negotiate an agreement.
13
 A typical 
example is the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, an agreement brokered 
by the US which led to a cold peace but did not solve underlying issues of Arab hostility 
towards Israel or the „Palestine problem‟. While the contribution of conflict management has 
been its focus on the leaders in power and their capabilities, it has also been criticised for 
ignoring everyone below the top leadership and for overlooking deeper causes of conflicts.
14
 
Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution is a more comprehensive approach than conflict management. As the term 
implies, it focuses on resolving the problems that led to a particular conflict by addressing the 
                                                          
7
 Reimann, Assessing the State-of-the-Art, p. 2. 
8
 Kevin Clements, „The State of the Art of Conflict Transformation‟, in Paul van Tongeren, Juliette Verhoeven 
and Hans van de Veen (eds.), Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention 
and Peacebuilding Activities (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 
9
 Laurent Goetschel, „Conflict Transformation‟, in Vincent Chetail (ed.), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 95. 
10
 Aggestam, Reframing and Resolving Conflict, p. 17. 
11
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System (London: Sage, 
2007), p. 50. 
12
 Paffenholz, Understanding Peacebuilding Theory, p. 3. 
13
 Miall, Conflict Transformation, p. 3. 
14
 Carolyn Schrock-Shenk, „Introducing Conflict and Conflict Transformation‟, in Carolyn Schrock-Shenk & 
Lawrence Ressler (eds.), Making Peace with Conflict (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1999), p. 35 
New Middle Eastern Studies 1 (2011) 
4 
 
fundamental issues at the conflict‟s roots.15 According to Edward Azar and John Burton, the 
aim of conflict resolution is to develop processes that are acceptable to parties in dispute and 
effective in resolving conflicts.
16
 The approach of conflict resolution is the best known of the 
three approaches presented here and has defined the field over the past half century.
17
 
However, critics (usually adherents of the conflict transformation approach) say that conflict 
resolution is not sufficiently concerned with the deeper structural and long-term relational 
aspects of conflicts, such as asymmetry in power and the protracted character of many 
contemporary conflicts.
18
 Examples of successful conflict resolution include various peace 
agreements between the Scandinavian countries which resolved centuries-long disputes.
19
 
Conflict Transformation 
Conflict transformation has become an increasingly popular approach in both practitioner and 
academic circles over the past 20 years mainly because of the inability of the conflict 
management and conflict resolution approaches to settle many contemporary protracted 
conflicts.
20
 The number of conflicts which have reverted to violence after a peace agreement 
is not clear due to some divergence in the research. This is mainly because of definition 
problems over what should be characterised as the recurrence of an old conflict or the 
outbreak of a new one. For example, if Israel reaches an agreement with the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and Hamas sabotages it, there appears to be no consensus on whether this 
should be seen as a new conflict or as the continuation of an old one. However, according to 
Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens, most researchers put the figure of reverted conflicts 
somewhere between one-third and one-half. In any case, it appears to be an indisputable fact 
that an unfortunately high number of violent conflicts have reverted to violence after they 
were supposedly solved.
21
 As the newest of these three approaches and as a relatively new 
invention within the broader field of peace and conflict studies, conflict transformation is still 
in a process of defining, shaping and creating terminology.
22
 In contrast to both conflict 
management and conflict resolution, conflict transformation focuses heavily on long-term 
commitments, aspects of justice, grass-root involvement and deep-rooted structural factors 
behind conflicts.
23
 Advocates of the conflict transformation approach believe that conflicts are 
generally not solved and, consequently, the goal should not be to solve them but to transform 
                                                          
15
Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbothan, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2005), p. 29.   
16
 Edvard Azar and John Burton, „Introduction‟, in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), International Conflict 
Resolution: Theory and Practice (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 1. 
17
 John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Intercourse: Good Books, 2003), p. 29.  
18 John Paul Lederach, „Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive 
Network‟, in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed), Conflict Transformation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 1995), 
p.201; Diana Francis, People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 
p. 37. 
19
 See Magnus Ericson, A Realist Stable Peace: Power, Threat and the Development of a Shared Norwegian-
Swedish Democratic Security Identity 1905-1940 (Lund: Lund Political Studies, 2000). 
20
 Cecilia Albin, „Explaining Conflict Transformation: How Jerusalem Became Negotiable‟, Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, 18:3 (2005), p. 340. 
21
 Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace (Coping with Crisis Working Paper 
Series, March 2007), p. 3.   
22
 Johannes Botes, „Conflict Transformation: A Debate Over Semantics or a Crucial Shift in the Theory and 
Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies?‟, International Journal of Peace Studies, 8:2 (2003), p. 1. 
23 Stephen Ryan, „Conflict transformation: Reasons to be modest‟, in Dennis Sandole et al. (eds), Handbook of 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution (New York: Routledge, 2008), p 304; Miall, Conflict Transformation, p. 3. 
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them.
24
 This approach is therefore a set of processes that engage with and transform 
relationships, structures, interests and if necessary, even the very constitution of society that 
supports the continuation of violent conflicts.
25
 Many researchers rightly see conflict 
transformation as a holistic approach which is much more demanding than the other two 
approaches.
26
 While the key in conflict transformation is to move the conflict away from 
destructive processes toward constructive ones, exactly what the term transformation means is 
widely debated within the field.
27
 As Christopher Mitchell, Laurent Goetschel and others have 
noted, conflict transformation necessarily implies bringing about some major changes in 
important aspects of the conflict.
28
 Consequently, the key questions for conflict 
transformation include the following: What aspects of the conflict need to be transformed? 
Which actors should be involved? Where should the transformation start (i.e. bottom-up or 
top-down)? In general, the literature does not give any consistent answers to these questions. 
Some researchers, like Stephen Ryan, have suggested that it might vary from conflict to 
conflict.
29
 Other researchers, like Raimo Väyrynen and Hugh Miall have tried to come up 
with general answers to these questions.
30
 Väyrynen, one of the pioneers in the field, has 
suggested that conflict transformation involves four dimensions (to which Miall has added a 
fifth): 
 
 Actor transformation, which means either internal changes in major parties or the 
appearance and recognition of new actors. 
 Issue transformation, which means altering the political agenda of conflict issues by 
reducing the importance of controversial issues and promoting issues of common interest. 
 Rule transformation, which means redefining the norms which the actors are expected to 
follow in their mutual relations. 
 Structural transformation, which means that the structure of the conflict is transformed by 
a change in the distribution of power or degree of interdependence.
31
 
 Context transformation (Miall‟s fifth dimension), which means a significant change in the 
surrounding regional or global setting.
32
 
 
Most researchers emphasise that conflict transformation includes focusing on aspects of 
justice and empowering grass-roots constituencies in conflict situations, although few 
                                                          
24 Johan Galtung, Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means: The Transcend Method, 
http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwt.nsf/db900SID/LHON-66SN 46?OpenDocument, (accessed 15 October  2010); Kumar 
Rupesinghe, „Introduction‟, in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed), Conflict Transformation (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 1995), p. viii.   
25
 Miall, Conflict Transformation, p. 4. 
26 Ibid; John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995); Rupesinghe, Conflict Transformation. 
27 John Paul Lederach and Michelle Maiese, „Conflict Transformation‟, in Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (eds), 
Beyond Intractability (Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado), http://www.beyondintract 
ability.org/essay/transformation, (accessed 25 October 2010). 
28
Christopher Mitchell, „Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform?‟, Peace 
and Conflict Studies, 9:1 (2002), p. 1; Goetschel, Conflict Transformation, p. 95.  
29
 Ryan, Conflict transformation: Reasons to be modest, p. 311. 
30
 Raimo Väyrynen, „To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International 
Conflicts‟, in Raimo Väyrynen (ed), New Directions in Conflict Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 
4-6; Miall, Conflict Transformation, p. 4. 
31
 Väyrynen, „To Settle or to Transform?‟, pp. 4-6. 
32
 Miall, Conflict Transformation, p. 10.  
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elaborate further on the role of justice in conflict transformation.
33
 Galtung has argued that the 
goal of conflict transformation is peace.
34
 According to Peter Wallensteen, a successful case 
of conflict transformation is one where the parties, the issues, and the expectations are 
changed so that there is no longer a fear of war arising from the relationship. An example of 
successful conflict transformation, according to Wallensteen, is the transformation of the 
East-West conflict after the Cold War.
35
 The fact that many contemporary protracted conflicts 
tend to resist negotiated agreements has shown that the other two approaches have failed in 
certain instances, which has paved the way for the conflict transformation approach. More 
specifically, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has repeatedly resisted various attempts of 
management and resolution, which means that both the approaches of conflict management 
and conflict resolution have been tried and have failed, thereby leaving the field open for the 
conflict transformation approach. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the basic ideas behind 
conflict transformation noted above seem to fit the current paradigm of this conflict. 
The Need for a New EU Strategy 
The EU‟s peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is made up of disparate activities by 
disparate bodies. The Commission is behind welfare and human rights promotion. The 
growing security role of the EU in terms of policing assistance, border monitoring and rule of 
law promotion is mostly taken care of by Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
missions. Much of these efforts are aimed at strengthening Palestinian institution-building in 
preparation for future statehood. The European Council, the EU's main decision-making body, 
together with High Representative Catherine Ashton, has the leading diplomatic role, 
particularly in formulating the Union‟s declaratory policies. In addition, the EU also has a 
Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte, whose role is to give 
further presence and visibility to the EU in the conflict.
36
 Both Israel and the PA have signed 
Association Agreements with the EU and they are both part of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP). As mentioned, the EU has been involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for 
over four decades, beginning in the early 1970s, when the EC issued its first statement calling 
for a just peace in the conflict. During the 1970s and 1980s, the EC was mainly active on the 
declaratory level and issued several controversial statements including the recognition of 
Arab and Palestinian claims, though little ever came of this on the more concrete policy level. 
From the early 1970s, it was clear that the peace negotiations were going to be dominated by 
the US and that the EU had to act in the shadow of American leadership. At the Madrid 
conference of 1991, where the Oslo peace process began, the EU struggled to even get a seat 
at the negotiating table and was only able to secure a minor role for itself as an observer. 
According to Ricardo Gomez, this was a clear sign of the EU‟s marginalisation.37 In many of 
the most important peace negotiations over the past two decades, the EU was only given 
secondary roles. Sometimes, such as in the 2010 peace talks in Washington, the EU was not 
                                                          
33
 Lederach, Preparing for Peace; Reimann, Assessing the State-of-the-Art. 
34
 Galtung, Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means. 
35
 Peter Wallensteen, „The Resolution and Transformation of International Conflicts: A Structural Perspective‟, 
in Raimo Vayrynen (ed.) New Directions in Conflict Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 130. 
36
 Annika Björkdahl, Oliver Richmond and Stefanie Kappler, The EU Peacebuilding Framework (JAD-PbP 
Working Paper Series No. 3, June 2009), p. 12.  
37
 Ricardo Gomez, Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign policy 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 124. 
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even invited to participate.
38
 Taken together with the fact that the EU lacks a major military 
capacity, this continued marginalisation shows that the EU is not capable of being a powerful 
conflict manager in line with the logic of political realism. The EU simply lacks the power 
and resources to bring pressure to the conflicting parties and induce them to negotiate an 
agreement. This is especially true because the Union appears unwilling to use its economic 
clout effectively against either Israel or the PA. Even if it were to do this, the EU would still 
not be able to provide military security guarantees in line with the conflict management 
approach. Neither has the EU or the rest of the international community achieved much in 
trying to resolve the conflict. The latest international mechanism in this regard, the Quartet, 
has achieved very little. Conflict resolution has for many years, in the words of Nathalie 
Tocci, been the „the cardinal objective‟ of the EU‟s foreign policy in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and most of the Union‟s peacebuilding efforts in the conflict have been aimed at 
some kind of conflict resolution.
39
 An example of this thinking can be found in the EU‟s 
security strategy document from 2003: 
Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will 
be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must 
remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state 
solution - which Europe has long supported - is now widely accepted. Implementing it will 
require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United 
Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the 
Palestinians themselves.
40
 
It is true, as the EU claims, that there is a widespread international consensus on the two state 
solution. However, there is no consensus between the current Israeli and Palestinian 
leadership on how to achieve a two state solution. In fact, the leadership on both sides is still 
plagued by deep internal divisions over how or even whether to divide the land. During these 
past two decades when the EU, the US and others have tried to resolve the conflict, Israeli 
settlements have increased significantly and the Palestinian leadership has split into two 
halves, the West Bank-based PA and Gaza-based Hamas, which both have questionable 
legitimacy. These developments have made the two state solution much more difficult to 
achieve. While the EU and the US have invested heavily in the Palestinian Prime Minister 
Salam Fayyad and his state-building project in order to keep the two state solution alive, there 
are no signs at present of an Israeli willingness to withdraw from major parts of the West 
Bank and dismantle settlements. This effectively makes Fayyad‟s project unattainable despite 
its attractiveness. When President Obama in December 2010 was not even capable of 
pressuring the Israeli Prime Minister to suspend construction in Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank for a three months period, it was finally clear that there was not much left of the conflict 
resolution approach.
41
 
                                                          
38
 Haaretz  (27/08/2010), France: EU must play a role in Israeli-Palestinian talks, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/france-eu-must-play-role-in-israeli-palestinian-talks-1.310630, 
(accessed 25 October 2010). 
39
 Nathalie Tocci, The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation (MICROCON Policy 
Working Paper No. 1, 2008), http://ssrn. com/ab stract=1194502, (accessed 15 October  2010), p. 2. 
40
 European Security Strategy, p. 8. 
41
 Al Jazeera (08/12/2010), US fails in settlements freeze bid, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2 
010/12/201012723481460146.html, (accessed 26 April 2011). 
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The EU and Conflict Transformation 
As there is little chance of resolving the conflict in the foreseeable future, the main argument 
of this article is that the EU should base its peacebuilding strategy on the principles of conflict 
transformation rather than on conflict management or conflict resolution. These two 
approaches have failed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thus paving the way for the conflict 
transformation approach. Indeed, the conflict transformation approach has much to offer the 
EU in terms of theoretical insights and everyday practice. The EU clearly does possess at least 
some of the necessary tools which are required for conflict transformation, such as long-term 
commitment, an emphasis on justice and support for grass-roots involvement. Perhaps most 
importantly, the EU can provide deep-rooted and structural change in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by its contractual agreements with the parties involved in the conflict. An EU 
peacebuilding strategy more clearly based on these principles of conflict transformation 
would have greater chances of being successful and would benefit both the EU and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It would not be a completely new approach; rather, it would mean 
strengthening already existing efforts aimed at transforming the conflict while abandoning 
efforts aimed at resolving the conflict, like the work of the Quartet, where the EU is one of 
four members. If the EU were to leave the Quartet, it would be possible for the Union to work 
more independently of the US and become more of a „player‟ in the conflict instead of 
maintaining its role as a „payer‟ within the Quartet. Against this background, I have identified 
four major contributions that the EU can provide to the peace process based on the principles 
of the conflict transformation approach. 
The EU can provide deep-rooted and structural change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
At the heart of the EU‟s peacebuilding efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies a strong 
emphasis on long-term institution-building and democracy promotion in the Palestinian 
territories.
42
 The EU is the largest donor to the Palestinian territories and has directed much of 
its peacebuilding effort at the strengthening of Palestinian institutions in preparation for a 
future Palestinian state. This policy has been controversial and the debate surrounding it has 
focused on several problematic aspects. Most grave are the allegations that the EU was 
effectively bearing the costs of Israel‟s occupation of the Palestinian territories by financing 
the PA budget, thus removing from Israel the obligation to provide such funding.
43
 Officials 
like Chris Patten have defended the EU from such allegations by arguing that the Union‟s 
economic contributions saved the Palestinian Authority from collapsing during the most 
troublesome moments of the Intifada and that without the Palestinian Authority there would 
be far less security and far more extremism in the Palestinian territories.
44
 In any case, over 
                                                          
42
 European Commission, Progress Report: the occupied Palestinian territory, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_519_en.pdf, (accessed 25 October 2010). 
43
 Anne Le More, „The Dilemma of Aid to the PA after the Victory of Hamas‟, The International Spectator, 41:2 
(2006), p. 92; Richard Youngs, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11 (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2006), p. 150. 
44
 Chris Patten, The Rt Hon Chris Patten Commissioner for External Relations Situation in the Middle East 
European Parliament - Plenary Session Strasbourg, 12 December 2001, http://europa.eu/rapid/press 
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/01 /627&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, 
(accessed 25 October 2010). 
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the last decade, the EU has come to believe that a democratic Palestinian state is the key to 
transforming the conflict.
45
 According to Thomas Diez and Michelle Page: 
The EU, as well as the so-called international community, had a specific belief that the 
transformation of the conflict in the Middle East lay in the export of a blueprint for democracy 
in Palestine.
46
 
When it comes to structural change, a powerful tool for the EU in promoting conflict 
transformation is the constructive engagement that the EU has with countries outside the 
Union. This constructive engagement takes the form of different contractual relations that 
range from offering full membership in the Union to looser forms of association. Beyond the 
objective of achieving various degrees of cooperation with countries and other actors outside 
the Union, these contractual ties also aim at fostering long-run structural change within third 
countries.
47
 While it is true that the EU‟s contractual ties are generally much weaker when 
accession to the Union is not on the agenda, the recent political upheavals in the Middle East 
and North Africa clearly show that there are opportunities for major structural change across 
the region. In addition to the Association Agreements with both Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority, the EU is also the largest provider of aid to the Palestinian Authority and Israel‟s 
largest trading partner.
48
 While the EU has so far not been able to translate its economic 
power into political influence and structural change, there is enormous potential for this in 
light of the ongoing democratic upheavals in the region. An increasingly isolated Israel might 
also find it more attractive to have closer relations with the EU. Consecutive polls in Israel 
show great support for EU membership among Israelis, particularly among the Jewish 
population. A recent poll in the Israeli daily Haaretz found that a remarkable 75 percent of 
Israeli Jews would like Israel to join the European Union.
49
 A future offer of EU membership 
to Israel and a future Palestinian state, perhaps together with same offer from NATO, would 
be a powerful incentive for the political elites, the business communities and the people of 
Israel/The Palestinian territories to reach a peace agreement and transform the conflict. 
The EU can now help to provide security for both Israelis and Palestinians   
The institutional development of the EU over the last decade has enabled the Union to 
become more of an international security actor, capable of assuming responsibility in 
security-related issues, which is something that was not possible a decade ago. Primarily, two 
CSDP missions are of importance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: EUBAM Rafah (border 
monitoring between Gaza and Egypt) and EUPOL COPPS (training of the Palestinian Civil 
Police in the West Bank). Even if both of these are non-executive missions and have a low 
profile, there seems to be a clear potential for an increased security role for the EU in the 
conflict. According to Christian Berger, the Head of the European Commission Technical 
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Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (ECTAO), these missions, particularly 
the EUBAM Rafah represent „a glimpse of the future‟ in the sense that a future peace 
agreement will probably include international observers, monitors and perhaps even troops at 
Israel‟s borders, some of which will likely be from the EU.50 Together with the evolution of 
the EU as an international security actor, the improvements in EU-Israel relations over the 
past decade have placed the EU in a better position regarding providing security in the region. 
The EUPOL COPPS and the EUBAM Rafah are two small but concrete steps in this regard, 
clearly showing that the EU is moving from being just a „payer‟ to become a „player‟ in the 
conflict, something the Union has long desired. As a relative newcomer in the security field, 
the EU still has fewer resources than the US, and remains by and large a junior partner in the 
peace process when it comes to security.
51
 Despite this, the EU has a real asset in that it is 
considered to be more balanced than the US by the Palestinians and less toothless than the UN 
by the Israelis. Another important factor is that the EU is more willing to act than the US in 
terms of deploying security-related missions on the ground in the conflict. This means that the 
EU is Israel‟s second best option and is sometimes its only option when the US is not willing 
to act. As Haim Assaraf, Counsellor at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said regarding 
EUBAM Rafah: „Nobody was really satisfied but we didn‟t have another option so we 
thought it would be good to give Europeans a role to play.‟52  
The EU should continue to emphasise demands for justice in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, demands for justice are mostly heard from the weaker side, 
which in this case are the demands of the Palestinians. Many Palestinians feel that they have 
been subjected to injustices of nearly epic proportions, and consequently, the sense of 
victimisation is enormous among the Palestinians, as is their quest for justice.
53
 In addressing 
this victimisation and quest for justice (which also exists on the Israeli side), the EU has 
explicitly included notions of justice in many of its most important statements on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict throughout the years. The EU has regularly used expressions such as „just 
peace‟ or „just solution‟ in its statements on the conflict. What is interesting here is that the 
content and the terminology of these declarations have clearly changed over the past 40 years. 
During this time, the Palestinian problem has moved from being a subordinated problem of 
refugees into becoming the most crucial issue in creating a broader framework for a more 
peaceful Middle East.
54
 This development has been reflected in the various EU statements on 
the Middle East peace process. As the years have passed and the Palestinian problem rose to 
prominence, the content and the terminology of EU statements changed, going from not 
mentioning the Palestinians at all as a party to the conflict in 1971, to recognizing the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians in 1973, their right to a homeland in 1977, self-
determination in 1980, their right to a state in 1999, and finally their right to a state with 
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Jerusalem as capital in 2009.
55
 Christian Berger, the head of the European Commission 
Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, says that the main 
accomplishment of 40 years of EU peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that the 
Union has played a major role in promoting some of the Palestinian‟s claims as legitimate 
demands.
56
 It is therefore possible to argue, as Sarah Anne Rennick has, that the EU has 
demonstrated its ability to be quite forward thinking in providing the parameters for a just 
peace in this conflict.
57
 As Haim Jacobi and David Newman have correctly noted, the EU has 
issued statements on many issues regarding the Middle East that were some years later 
adopted in a similar way by other countries in the international community, most notably by 
the US and by successive Israeli governments.
58
 After leading the discursive shift towards 
recognition of the legitimacy of Palestinian grievances, the challenge now for the EU is to 
translate its declaratory policies into concrete action. A major justice issue for the future will 
be how to solve the problem of resettling the Palestinian refugees. While no perfect solution 
exists to this problem, the EU could help to contribute to a solution by proposing to fund the 
resettling of refugees in a future Palestinian state, by helping a small minority to resettle in 
Israel, by offering EU citizenship to some and by offering financial compensation to those 
who chose to reside where they now live. Such concrete action on one of the final status 
issues in the conflict could serve two purposes: it would set a strong precedent that other 
international actors might follow and would also transform the conflict by helping to resolve 
one of the conflict‟s most problematic issues. 
The EU can empower civil society organisations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
Successful conflict transformation requires, according to nearly all researchers, the 
engagement and support of local civil society organisations (CSOs).
59
 The EU has 
acknowledged this and, as the main donor for the Palestinian territories, the Union supports a 
plethora of different Palestinian CSOs, in addition to some Israeli CSOs as well. For example, 
the EU‟s Partnership for Peace Programme directly supports local civil society initiatives in 
the region that promote peace, tolerance and non-violence. Emanuele Giaufret, the former 
head of the economic and political section of the Delegation of the European Commission to 
Israel, described the relationship between the Union‟s peacebuilding efforts in the conflict and 
the local civil society in this way:  
The overall objective of the EU Partnership for Peace Programme is to help provide a solid 
foundation at the civil society level for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The 
programme aims to foster wider public exposure to and involvement in the efforts aimed at 
finding peace in the region. It also aims to strengthen and increase direct civil society 
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relationships and cooperation based on equality and reciprocity between citizens of the region 
including Israelis of Jewish and Arab origin. Moreover, the Programme aims at broadening the 
base of support for the peace process in both Israeli and Arab societies by reaching out to those 
who are traditionally less sensible to peace efforts in the region.
60
 
However, it is well-known that the EU‟s support and funding of various CSOs have been 
problematic in many respects. Over the years, there have been constant allegations levelled 
against the EU regarding the misuse of funds and the lack of transparency. The critics, 
representing basically all sides in the conflict, seem to agree that the EU‟s money is not well 
spent.
61
 It should be noted that the specific allegations against the EU have more to do with 
ineffectiveness or misuse of funds than pure corruption. For example, there is clear evidence 
that the EU has been supporting CSOs with objectives contrary to the EU‟s own objectives. 
One of the best known examples is Adalah, a Palestinian CSO which advocates a solution to 
the conflict that resembles a one-state solution, an objective which of course is fundamentally 
contrary to the EU positions on the conflict.
62
 In the end, this comes down to the principal 
question of the appropriateness of funding CSOs with agendas different than those of the EU. 
Moreover, there is also a potential, and in the EU‟s case often a real problem, in striving for 
local ownership while at the same time excluding those CSOs with objectives contrary to the 
EU‟s own objectives. This is particularly true with regard to the various Islamic groups that 
are active in the Palestinian territories. Yet it appears that a genuine conflict transformation is 
unlikely if large sections of the population are excluded, so the EU should explore the 
possibilities for supporting non-political Islamic CSOs. A first step in this regard would be to 
open up a dialogue with groups like Adalah. 
Conclusion 
As the EU enters its fifth decade of peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is 
increasingly clear that the prospects for resolving the conflict in the near future are slim. On 
the Israeli side, there seems to be no willingness to make the necessary concessions. On the 
Palestinian side, the problem is not so much the willingness of the PA, but rather its capability 
to resolve the conflict in light of the split with Hamas. As the conflict resolution approach has 
reached a dead end, and as the EU cannot be an effective manager of the conflict in line with 
the conflict management approach, the EU should invest its resources in conflict 
transformation and direct its peacebuilding efforts at transforming rather than managing or 
resolving the conflict. This means in practice that the EU should leave the Quartet and try to 
disassociate itself from American attempts at resolving the conflict, which have led nowhere 
over the last decade. What the EU should do instead is to try to make a serious contribution to 
peace in the Middle East by transforming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU can provide 
structural change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by deepening its constructive engagements 
with both Israelis and Palestinians and with the countries in the wider region. In Israel, the 
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appeal of the EU is indeed strong and many Israelis are looking for closer cooperating with 
the Union. Likewise, the recent political upheavals in several Arab countries show that 
previously silent majorities are now looking for structural change, more democracy and more 
economic opportunities. All this can be exploited by the EU through the conflict 
transformation approach. As the Middle East now enters a period of transition, the future 
prospects for constructive EU involvement in the Middle East certainly look more promising 
than they have in the past. 
